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1 INTRODUCTION
The simple version of the New-Keynesian model (Woodford, 2003; chapter 3) has been extended
in recent years to incorporate the endogenous determination of unemployment uctuations in the
labor market. For instance, Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009) combined search frictions of the kind
introduced in the Mortensen-Pissarides literature with sticky prices à la Calvo (1983).
Alternatively, this paper incorporates wage stickiness as the source for unemployment uctua-
tions in the New-Keynesian model. As a close reference, Casares (2007, 2008) describes a model
where sticky wages produce mismatches between hours of labor supply and labor demand. Sticky
wages bring non-renegotiated labor contracts implying a di¤erence between the total hours sup-
plied by households and those demanded by the rms. Here, we modify the labor market structure
of Casares (2008) in order to obtain a model with xed hours per worker and labor uctuations
at the extensive margin (employment and unemployment). In turn, labor uctuations are driven
exclusively by changes in the level of employment which might be considered a fair simplication.1
Thus, labor contracts are signed at a xed number of hours as assumed in Hansen (1985), and other
papers.2 Consequently, the households disutility of work only varies when there are changes in the
number of family members employed. This di¤erence becomes crucial when bringing the models
to the data, as observed unemployment uctuations can be observed from the data whereas the
di¤erence between total hours supplied and total hours demanded is not observable.
We follow a Bayesian econometric strategy to estimate the model using U.S. quarterly data
during the Great Moderation period (1984-2008). The estimation results provide a good t of the
model to the data and suggest that the measures of price and wage stickiness are quantitatively high
and similar. We also estimate the model suggested by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) which
provides a natural benchmark for a sticky-wage model but displays no unemployment uctuations.
1 It is generally accepted that most variability of U.S. total hours worked is explained by changes in the number
of employed people (extensive margin) whereas the number of hours at work (intensive margin) has signicantly less
inuence. Quoting the abstract of Cho and Cooley (1994): "Approximately one quarter of the adjustment in total
hours of employment over the business cycle represents adjustments in hours, while the remainder is explained by
changes in employment".
2See Cooley and Hansen (1989), Merz (1995) and, more recently, Blanchard and Galí (2007)
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Throughout the paper, EHL is the acronym used to refer to the model based on the paper by
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) whereas CMV is the name of the alternative sticky-wage
model (CMV comes from the initials of our last names). While the parameter estimates are rather
similar across models, the estimates obtained for Calvo probabilities suggest slightly shorter price
stickiness and longer wage stickiness in CMV compared to EHL. Moreover, the estimate of the
price ination inertial component is lower in CMV than in EHL, yielding a more forward-looking
ination process. By comparing second moment statistics (standard deviations, correlations with
output and rst-order autocorrelations) of output, ination, wage ination and the nominal interest
rate obtained from actual data with those obtained from the two estimated models, we observe that
both models provide a similar t of the cyclical features characterizing the Great Moderation period.
More importantly, unlike EHL, the estimated CMV is able to reproduce a large extent of the second
moment statistics of unemployment.
Finally, this paper also makes a contribution to the calculation of the welfare cost of business
cycles. The analysis is carried out using the estimated parameters of the CMV and EHL models
with U.S. data of the Great Moderation. Short-run uctuations cause a welfare loss measured
as a permanent 0.60% of consumption in the CMV model (extensive margin) and as 0.86% of
consumption in the EHL model (intensive margin). These numbers for the welfare cost of business
cycles are signicantly higher than the one suggested by Lucas (2003).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the CMV model and compares it with the
EHL model. Section 3 introduces the estimation procedure and shows the parameter estimates.
Section 4 presents the empirical t of the two models whereas a robustness analysis of the CMV
estimation results is carried out in Section 5. Next, Section 6 computes the welfare cost of cyclical
uctuations estimated with either model. Section 7 concludes.
2 THE MODEL
Let the labor market of our proposed CMV model provide employment uctuations at the extensive
margin. For that purpose, we assume indivisible labor hours as in Hansen (1985), so that workers
spend a constant number of daily hours at work. Thus, variations on total hours are exclusively
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driven by changes in the number of employed people.
As in Merz (1995) and most papers of the Mortensen-Pissarides literature, the representative
household is a large family and their members pool di¤erentiated labor income to be evenly split
up in consumption shares in a way that they all are perfectly insured against unemployment. Let
us dene h as the constant number of hours per employee at work and nt(i; j) as the number of
household members working in the industry characterized by some specic i-th nominal wage and
j-th price. Thus, total hours worked at the (i; j) industry are nt(i; j)h. Assuming constant relative
risk aversion, the utility function for the representative household is given by
U(t; ct; n
s
t (i; j)) = exp(t)
[ct]
1 
1    	
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
[nst (i; j)h]
1+
1 + 
didj;
where ct is current households consumption, nst (i; j)h are total hours supplied in the rm holding
the i-th wage and the j-th price, and t is a consumption preference shock that follows an exogenous
AR(1) process. Dening 	 = 	h1+ , we can rewrite the utility function as
U(t; ct; n
s
t (i; j)) = exp(t)
[ct]
1 
1    	
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
[nst (i; j)]
1+
1 + 
didj: (1)
Regarding rmsbehavior, we follow Casares (2008) by considering a model with prot-maximizing
sticky prices set by monopolistically competitive rms, sticky wages a¤ecting labor contracts, and
a production technology with constant capital and diminishing labor returns. Both sticky prices
and sticky wages are specied by respective constant probabilities as assumed initially by Calvo
(1983). Therefore, rms can be distinguished according to specic prices and wages. The only
di¤erence from the model of Casares (2008) is that the negotiation of wage contracts occurs here at
the extensive margin and not at the intensive margin. Wage setting is aimed at an intertemporal
matching between the number of job applicants supplied by the household and the number of jobs
demanded by the rms, provided a constant number of hours per job. Thus, there are jobs-clearing
wage contracts in our model (extensive margin) while there were hours-clearing wage contracts
(intensive margin) in Casares (2008). At rst, the di¤erence between the two models may seem
irrelevant because the two models share identical economic dynamics (more precise, the log-linear
representations of both models coincide), but it becomes relevant when estimating the two models
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because the model introduced in this paper generates employment uctuations in the extensive
margin, so unemployment time series can be used in the estimation procedure.
We now introduce wage rigidities. Let w be the constant probability à la Calvo (1983) that the
rm and the household cannot get together to negotiate a new wage contract. If that is the case,
the nominal wage is adjusted by the indexation rule introduced below and the household is required
to supply as many jobs as needed to meet demand.3 Otherwise, with a probability 1   w, the
rm and the household sit down to nd the nominal wage that satises the following jobs-clearing
condition
Et
1P
j=0
jjw
h
nst+j(i; j)  ndt+j(i; j)
i
= 0; (2)
where nst+j(i; j) and n
d
t+j(i; j) are respectively the quantity of jobs supplied and demanded in the
specic industry, Et is the rational expectation operator conditional to the lack of wage contract
revisions in the future, and 2(0; 1) is the discount factor. Firms post demand for jobs and
households supply a number of job seekers. The rst-order condition of the household for the
supply of labor implies a constant elasticity of substitution, 1=, across wage-specic industries.
This condition can be expressed in terms of log-deviations from steady-state values:
bnst (i; j) = 1 cWt(i; j) cWt+ bnst ; (3)
where cWt = R 10 R 10 cWt(i; j)didj is the log-deviation of the average nominal wage from its steady-
state level and bnst = R 10 R 10 bnst (i; j)didj is the log-deviation of the average labor supply from the
steady-state level of employment. Meanwhile, labor demand is the amount required to produce as
many units of output as demanded in the monopolistically competitive market. The production
technology relates rm-specic output to the demand for total hours of labor, ndt (i; j)h, and an
AR(1) technology shock, zt, as follows: yt(i; j) = exp(zt)

ndt (i; j)h
1 
with 0 <  < 1 which
implies diminishing returns of labor. In log-deviations from steady-state, we get:
byt(i; j) = (1  )bndt (i; j) + zt:
3The arrival of a Calvo signal that impedes setting the jobs-clearing nominal wage would oblige the household to
meet labor demand. It is a similar situation that faces the rm that cannot set the optimal price. Thus, the e¤ective
amounts of output and labor are demand determined.
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Combining the last expression with a log-linearized Dixit-Stiglitz demand curve commonly used in
the New-Keynesian literature, we obtain
bndt (i; j) =   1    bPt(i; j)  bPt+ bnt; (4)
where  > 0 denotes the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution and bnt = R 10 R 10 bndt (i; j)didj is the
aggregate level of employment expressed in terms of log-deviation from its steady-state value.
Summarizing, jobs-clearing wages are set whenever market frictions permit labor at the value
that solves the log-linear version of (2), provided current and future expressions of equations (3)
and (4), which respectively govern supply and demand for labor. Wage rigidities explain the arrival
of mismatches between the number of jobs demanded and the number of workers who wish to work.
At the industry level, we have
ut(i; j) = bnst (i; j)  bndt (i; j):
The aggregation across sectorial unemployment leads to the following expression for the rate of
unemployment4
ut =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
ut(i; j)didj = bnst   bnt:
Moreover, the system (2)-(4) brings a connection between pricing behavior and wage setting at
industry level (absent in standard Mortensen-Pissarides frameworks). The optimal price decision
will be a¤ected by the rm-specic circumstances (the history of Calvo probabilities) yielding
nominal wage di¤erentiation across rms. Meanwhile, nominal wages are set at di¤erent values
depending upon particular pricing conditions. For instance, after an expansionary demand shock
rms that can price optimally and hold nominal wages above the average wage will increase prices
further up because they are facing higher marginal costs. In addition, rm-specic wages will be
lower for a rm that has a higher price than the average because labor demand is much weaker with
high prices. In particular, it can be proved that there is a positive relationship between the rm-
specic relative optimal price and relative past wages, bP t (i; j) = bP t +1 cWt 1(i; j) cWt 1, where
4Blanchard and Galí (2007) and Casares (2007, 2008) also use this denition for the rate of unemployment in
scenarios where employees work fewer hours than they would like (that is, employment uctuations occur in the
intensive margin).
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the (i; j) index distinguishes industry-specic variables from economy-wide averages. Also, there is a
negative dependence between relative wages and relative prices, cWt(i; j) = cWt 2  bPt(i; j)  bPt.5
Endogenous inertia on price and wage dynamics can be added to improve the empirical t of
the model. Thus, rms that cannot price optimally will apply a price indexation rule built as
a weighted reaction to the previous rate of ination and the steady-state rate of ination plus a
stochastic white-noise deviation:
Pt(i; j) = Pt 1(i; j)
h
(1 + pt 1)
p(1 + p + pt )
1 p
i
;
where pt 1 is economy-wide lagged ination, 
p is the steady-state rate of ination and pt is a
price indexation shock. The parameter p 2 [0; 1] measures the weight assigned to lagged ination
in the indexation rule. The particular setting p = 0 eliminates the inuence of lagged ination on
the price indexation rule and leaves out the inertial dynamics of ination.
Firms and households agree on a wage indexation rule for the nominal wage contracts that
cannot be renegotiated. Similarly to prices, the wage indexation rule reects a weighted reaction
to lagged wage ination and steady-state wage ination plus a stochastic white-noise deviation, as
follows:
Wt(i; j) =Wt 1(i; j)
h
(1 + wt 1)
w(1 + w + wt )
1 w
i
;
where Wt(i; j) is the rm-specic nominal wage set in period t, wt 1 is lagged wage ination, w
is the steady-state rate of wage ination, and wt is a white-noise wage indexation shock. The
parameter w 2 [0; 1] accommodates the weight of lagged wage ination in the indexation rule. If
w = 0, the indexation rule lacks from a backward-looking pattern.
The full CMV model can be expressed as the following linearized system of equations:
pt =
p
1+p
pt 1 +

1+p
Et
p
t+1 +
p
1+p
b t + 1 p1+ppt ; (5)
b t = bwt   (byt   bnt); (6)
5Analytical expressions of 1 and 2 are found to be
1 =
(1 p)w
(1 pw)

1+

1 +2

1  (1 p)w
1 pw
 and 2 = (1 w)
(1 )(1 wp)

1+
1w
(1 )

1  p(1 w)
1 wp
 .
See Casares (2008) for the proof.
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wt =
w
1+w
wt 1 +

1+w
Et
w
t+1   w1+wut + 1 w1+w wt ; (7)
bwt = bwt 1 + wt   pt ; (8)
byt = (1  )bnt + zt; (9)
ut = bnst   bnt; (10)
bnst = 1 ( bwt   byt + t); (11)
byt = Etbyt+1   1  Rt   Ett+1   (1  )t ; (12)
Rt = (1  R)
h

p
t + y(byt   byt)i+ RRt 1 + "Rt ; (13)
+
1  + 
byt = 1+1 zt + t: (14)
There are ten endogenous variables: the rate of price ination, pt ; the rate of wage ination, 
w
t ; the
real marginal cost, b t; the real wage, bwt; output, byt; the unemployment rate, ut; the average labor
supply, bnst ; the average (e¤ective) labor demand, bnt; the nominal interest rate, Rt; and potential
(natural-rate) output byt. Variables topped with a hat symbol represent log-deviations from their
respective steady-state levels, whereas the remaining variables represent the di¤erence in levels with
respect to their respective steady-state rates. Model variability comes from ve exogenous shocks:
zt, t, 
p
t , 
w
t , and "
R
t . Only the technology shock (zt) and the consumption preference shock (t)
are serially correlated; the other three (nominal) shocks are considered white-noise independent
processes. The quasi-slope coe¢ cients p and w have the same analytical expressions as in the
forward-looking model shown in Casares (2008):
p =
(1 p)(1 p)
p

1+ 
1 +2

1  w(1 p)
1 pw

and
w =
(1 w)(1 w)
w

1+1
w
1 

1  p(1 w)
1 pw
 :
Let us briey describe the model equations (5)-(14). The price-ination equation, (5), is a
hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips curve that combines both backward and forward-looking dynamics.
It is obtained from log-linearizing the rst-order condition of the optimal price in a monopolisti-
cally competitive economy with Calvo-type frictions on price setting and on jobs-clearing nominal
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wages. Equation (6) is a log-linear denition of the real marginal cost where labor productivity
is obtained from a technology with diminishing marginal returns. Wage-ination dynamics are
governed by equation (7), that resembles the seminal Phillips (1958) curve because it displays a
negative relationship between wage ination and unemployment. In a similar way to price ination,
there are both backward and forward-looking components characterizing wage ination dynamics,
the former due to the assumption of indexation on lagged wage ination. Jobs-clearing wage set-
ting, Calvo-style sticky wages and a wage indexation rule result in the wage ination dynamics
implied by equation (7). Actually, sticky wages are crucial to explain employment uctuations in
the extensive margin (as well as in the intensive margin, as discussed in Casares (2007 and 2008)).
Those non-renegotiated nominal wages deliver a mismatch between the households supply of labor
measured as the number of job seekers and the rms demand for labor measured as the number
of jobs posted, which after aggregation corresponds to our measure of unemployment.
Real wage dynamics are provided by equation (8). The Cobb-Douglas production technology
with constant capital and a technology shock is log-linearized in equation (9). The rate of unem-
ployment is endogenously dened by equation (10) as the log-di¤erence between average supply of
labor and the average labor demand measured as the number of jobs (extensive margin).
The labor supply function and the IS curve (equations (11) and (12)) are obtained from the
households optimizing behavior using the utility function specication (1). Concretely, the combi-
nation of consumption and labor rst-order equations together with the market-clearing condition
that equates consumption and output, leads to the labor supply equation (11). The IS-type equa-
tion (12) is obtained from log-linearizing the consumption Euler equation.
Next, monetary policy follows a Taylor (1993)-type rule with a smoothing component and an
interest-rate shock described in equation (13). The nominal interest rate changes endogenously in
response to changes in the rate of ination, the output gap and the lagged nominal interest rate. The
output gap is calculated as the log-deviation between current output and potential (natural-rate)
output. Finally, uctuations of potential output are obtained from equation (14), which provides
deviations of output from steady state if the economy were released from nominal rigidities, i.e.
setting p = w = 0.
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2.1 A comparison with the EHL (2000) model
EHL (2000) introduce sticky wages in a New Keynesian model. Staggered nominal wages repro-
duce the constant probability scheme of Calvo (1983)-type contracts that are applied to pricing
decisions. Thus, there are both sticky prices and sticky wages à la Calvo (1983). In spite of hav-
ing wage rigidities, the EHL model is known as a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model. The labor market is at equilibrium in every period, with no room for excess labor supply
(unemployment). Households own a di¤erentiated labor service that gives them market power to
set the nominal wage. Letting w be the Calvo probability that unables optimal wage setting and
adding a wage indexation rule identical to the CMV model described above, uctuations of wage
ination in the EHL model are given by the following forward-looking equation:
wt =
w
1+w
wt 1 +

1+w
Et
w
t+1 +
(1 w)(1 w)
w(1+f )
(dmrst   bwt) + 1 w1+w wt ; (15)
where dmrst   bwt is the log-di¤erence between the households marginal rate of substitution (mrs)
and the real wage, and f is the labor demand elasticity of substitution.
Remarkably, the CMV model features a semi-loglinear relationship between the rate of unem-
ployment and the gap that drives wage ination uctuations in the EHL model, dmrst  bwt. Hence,
inserting the equation (11) that determines uctuations of the labor supply in the unemployment
denition (10), it yields
ut =
1

( bwt   byt + t)  bnt: (16)
Meanwhile, the expression for dmrst implied by the utility function specied above is6
dmrst = bnt   t + byt: (17)
6Provided the same specication for the instantaneous utility function used in the CMV model (see expression 1
from Section 2), the marginal rate of substitution between the supply of i-type jobs at the rm j and consumption
is:
mrst(i; j) =
	nst (i; j)

exp(t)c
 
t
:
Log-linearizing this expression, using the equilibrium condition bct = byt, and aggregating across job types and rms
lead to the expression shown in the main text.
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Comparing (16) and (17), it is straightforward to see that
dmrst   bwt =  ut; (18)
which obviously is only a valid statement for the CMV model, since in the EHL model there are
not such job mismatches.
The relationship between unemployment and the mrs-wage gap implied by (18) can be substi-
tuted in the wage ination equation of the CMV model, equation (7), to obtain
wt =
w
1+w
wt 1 +

1+w
Et
w
t+1 +
w
1+w
1
 (dmrst   bwt) + 1 w1+w wt : (19)
Hence, the labor market structures of the CMV and EHL models are di¤erent in two aspects.
First, the interpretation of aggregate labor uctuations, bnt, is di¤erent. Thus, bnt represents total
number of hours at work (intensive margin) in the EHL model whereas it does the total number
of workers employed (extensive margin) in the CMV model. Secondly, the analytical expression
that governs wage ination dynamics is di¤erent. Comparing the EHL equation (15) with its jobs-
clearing counterpart (19), it can be noticed how the slope coe¢ cient in (19) depends upon the
value of w which collects the connections between pricing and wage setting. Such connections are
absent in the EHL model.
Regarding the price ination equation, rms set prices under Calvo nominal rigidities in both
models. When receiving the right market signal, the optimal price depends positively on both the
aggregate price level and the real marginal cost. To make the version of the EHL model used here
comparable to the CMV model, it is assumed constant capital and the same price indexation rule
for the cases of non-optimal pricing. When abstracting from variable capital, the real marginal
cost is rm-specic which implies a atter slope of the Phillips curve (Sbordone, 2002). Thus, the
Phillips curve that drives ination dynamics in the version of the EHL model with constant capital
and a price indexation rule is
pt =
p
1+p
pt 1 +

1+p
Et
p
t+1 +
(1 p)(1 p)
p(1+=(1 ))(1+p)
b t + 1 p1+ppt : (20)
The only di¤erence with the Phillips curve of the CMV model is the slope coe¢ cient. By comparing
the slopes of (20) and (5) and noting the analytical expression that determines p, we can conclude
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that the slope coe¢ cient is lower in the CMV model. Therefore, the reaction of ination to changes
in the real marginal cost is smaller in the CMV model. This di¤erence can again be explained by
the connections between wage setting and price setting that are present in the CMV model (see
Casares, 2008). In short, any price increase that comes after a rise of the real marginal cost would
reduce rm-specic labor demand and, subsequently, the jobs-clearing nominal wage. A falling
nominal wage would partially compensate the initial increase in the real marginal cost in a way
that would cut the price hike. In turn, the price level and ination would have a weaker response
to changes in the aggregate real marginal cost (lower slope coe¢ cient).
3 ESTIMATION
3.1 Data and estimation procedure
The Great Moderation period (1984:1Q-2008:2Q) has been characterized by mild uctuations of
most (both real and nominal) aggregate variables (see Stock and Watson, 2002, among others).
Thus, we would expect not to su¤er from any important misspecication sources, such as parameter
instability in both the private sector -for instance, Calvo probabilities (Moreno, 2004)- and the
monetary policy reactions to ination or output (Canova, 2009). Indeed, some authors argue that
a sound monetary policy implementation is the main factor behind the low aggregate volatility since
the mid-1980s (Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999). In the robustness exercises conducted below, we
compare the results obtained during the Great Moderation with those found in the pre-Volcker
period.
The CMV and EHL models are estimated with U.S. quarterly data of the Great Moderation.
The variables used in the estimation are the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the price ina-
tion rate obtained from the implicit GDP deator, the wage ination rate obtained from nominal
compensation per hour, the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the unemployment rate. Real GDP was
logged and linearly detrended to extract the cyclical component of output. The data were retrieved
from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis (FRED) database. In the robustness section below, we also
show that results are not specic to the detrending method (or to the use of output growth instead
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of detrended output) as well as to the inclusion of a measure of employment in the set of variables.
We estimate the alternative models using a two-step Bayesian procedure. In the rst step, the log
posterior function is maximized in a way that combines the prior information of the parameters with
the empirical likelihood of the data. In a second step, we perform the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
to compute the posterior distribution of the parameter set. Notice that the slope coe¢ cients in the
price and wage ination equations are implicit functions of the undertermined coe¢ cients 1 and
2. These coe¢ cients can be analytically solved through a non-linear two-equation system. We
pick the positive values associated with these solutions, as implied by theory.
The selection of prior distributions for the model parameters is based on similar related studies
(Smets and Wouters, 2007, and Gertler et al. 2008). The priors for the utility function parameters
 and  are set at 2.0 and 4.0, respectively; with standard deviations 0.1 and 0.5, respectively. The
prior for the elasticity of substitution across goods () is set at 6, which implies a 20% mark-up
in steady state. The prior distribution for the two backward-looking parameters in the price and
wage ination equations (p; w) is a normal with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1. Exactly the
same priors are chosen for the Calvo probabilities of price and wage adjustment (p; w), implying
an average duration of both wage and price contracts of six months. The priors of the production
function parameter and the subjective time discount factor ( and ) are the standard values of 0.36
and 0.99, respectively; with standard deviation of 0.01. Following Gertler et al. (2008), monetary
policy parameters are set at 0.75 for the endogenous persistence parameter, 1.7 for the long-run
response to ination and 0.125 for the response to cyclical output. Also following their priors, the
standard deviations of the innovations to the shocks come from an inverse gamma distribution with
mean and standard deviation 0.15, whereas the autocorrelation parameters of the technology and
preference shocks are set at 0.5, with standard deviation 0.1.
3.2 Estimation results
Table 1 reports the prior and posterior distributions of each parameter in our proposed CMV model,
together with the 5 and 95 percentiles of the posterior distributions. The table also compares the
posterior distributions with those obtained -using the same priors- in the estimation of the version
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of the EHL model described in Section 2.
Table 1 shows that all parameter estimates are statistically di¤erent from zero, with statistical
condence bands varying in size, but small overall. In several cases, the posteriors are close to
the priors, where in some instances, they are signicantly distant. In particular, the posterior of
the "deep" parameters (preferences, technology and market structure) are very close to the priors.
The estimate for the curvature of the consumption utility function  is 2.11, showing a moderate
sensibility of output to real interest rate changes. As for the labor disutility parameter , it is esti-
mated at 4.66, implying a relatively low labor supply elasticity consistent with most microeconomic
evidence. The parameter measuring the Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity, , is estimated to be 6.18.
The capital share in the production function, , matches the prior level of 0.36, the same as the time
discount parameter, , which remains at 0.99. We nd values of the backward-looking parameters
in the price and wage ination equations below the prior value of 0.50. In contrast, the parameters
that measure the Calvo-type price and wage rigidities are estimated to be around 0.84, much higher
than the 0.5 prior, implying high price and wage rigidities.7 These values for the Calvo parameters
are somewhat higher than those obtained for the Great Moderation by Smets and Wouters (2007)
in their New-Keynesian model with sticky wages à la EHL, i.e. without unemployment.8 The price
adjustment parameter is similar to that estimated by Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008), whereas our
estimate of the wage adjustment parameter is quite higher (they estimate it to be 0.71). The values
obtained for the monetary policy parameters are in line with those reported in the literature for
the period considered: a high coe¢ cient on the lag of the interest rate parameter (0.84), a large
7Nevertheless, sticky prices do not imply rm-specic constant prices in the models. It should be recalled that
rms that cannot price optimally will adjust current prices by applying the indexation rule that takes into account
lagged ination, the steady-state rate of ination and the price indexation shock. With a similar wage indexation
rule, nominal wages also change every period. A greater extent of nominal rigidities result in a larger fraction of
price/wage adjustment that follow the indexation rule.
8Apparently, a large extent of both price and wage stickiness might seem counterintuitive during the Great
Moderation period. However, the low-ination scenario featuring this period would reduce variability on relative
prices and, therefore, the average cost of deviating from optimal pricing. Thus, the presence of menu costs or
information costs could more easily postpone the search of the optimal price during the Great Moderation. The high
estimates of p found here may capture this e¤ect.
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interest rate response to ination (2.00) and a lower response to output (0.70). Finally, the size of
the IS innovation is signicantly higher than those of the other shocks.
Table 1 also shows that the parameter estimates of the CMV model are quite similar to those
obtained in the estimation of the EHL model.9 Indeed, the condence intervals associated with
each parameter estimate, obtained from the two models, always overlap except for y, showing that
parameter estimate di¤erences between the two models are not statistically signicant. However,
based on the point estimates, there are some di¤erences that deserve discussion. The estimate of the
backward-looking parameter p for ination dynamics is lower in our proposed CMV model (0.47)
compared to the gure obtained in the EHL model (0.59). The values for the Calvo-adjustment
probabilities are found to be similar across models (around 0.84). Nevertheless, the EHL estimates
imply somewhat lower wage rigidities, but higher price rigidities. The estimates of the monetary
policy rule parameters are again similar, with a higher output response in the CMV model. Finally,
the standard deviation of the innovations to price ination shocks is smaller in the CMV model,
whereas the standard deviation of the innovations to IS shocks is estimated to be higher in the
EHL model.
4 EMPIRICAL FIT
This section compares the performance of CMV and EHL models along three dimensions. First,
we analyze the ability of the two models to reproduce business cycle statistics obtained from
actual data. Second, we study the contribution of each structural shock in explaining the total
variance decomposition of important endogenous variables. Finally, we carry out an impulse-
response analysis.
9 In the estimation of the EHL model, the U.S. time series of total hours was used in replacement of unemployment,
which is absent in that model. Thus, the time series of "Hours of All Persons in the Nonfarm Business Sector" was
logged and linearly detrended to extract the business cycle component that was added to the set of observable
variables.
15
4.1 Second-moment statistics
Table 2 shows second-moment statistics obtained from actual U.S. data (rst panel), and the ones
found in the estimated CMV (second panel) and EHL (third panel) models. In general, the two
models do a good job in reproducing the cyclical features of the data. Thus, both models capture
the volatility of output, the interest rate and wage ination and the low volatility of price ination.
Moreover, the two models replicate reasonably well the rst-order autocorrelation of all variables.
However, the CMV model outperforms the EHL model in two important dimensions. First, the
CMV reproduces the mildly cyclical correlation of the nominal interest rate and price ination,
while the EHL model gives a slightly positive correlation of these variables with output. Second,
and more importantly, the CMV model endogenously explains unemployment uctuations, unlike
the EHL model, where the labor market is always at equilibrium. Indeed, the CMV model provides
business cycle statistics on volatility, correlation with output and autocorrelation that describe
accurately the unemployment uctuations observed in U.S. data. Perhaps, the only signicant
discrepancy is that the CMV model underpredict a bit the observed unemployment persistence.
4.2 Variance decomposition
Tables 3-4 show the total variance decomposition analysis for the CMV and EHL models, respec-
tively. The two models show similar variance decompositions patterns for most variables. Thus,
output variance is mainly driven by IS shocks, , whereas productivity innovations, z, play a sec-
ondary role. The opposite is true for potential output. Labor (demand and supply) variance is
fundamentally determined by IS innovations in the two models. Price and wage ination variance
are almost entirely determined by their own exogenous shocks (p and w, respectively). Real wage
variance is also driven by p and w, with the latter having a larger share.
A large share of interest rate variance is determined by IS innovations in the CMV model with
the interest rate innovations, ("R), playing a minor role. By contrast, these two innovations have
a similar share in the interest rate variance decomposition associated with the EHL model. The
variance decomposition of unemployment uctuations is only reported in the CMV model because
the EHL model does not include unemployment. As Table 3 shows, the CMV model reveals quite
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dispersion in the sources of unemployment variability. Monetary policy shocks and IS shocks take
approximately two thirds of total variability, whereas supply-side shocks only contribute to explain
around one fourth of changes in unemployment. Among the latter, the wage indexation shock
causes one fth of total variability while technology innovations have little inuence (less than
10%) on unemployment variability.
4.3 Impulse-response functions
Figure 1 shows the estimated impulse responses to the alternative structural shocks in the CMV and
EHL models. The shock impulse has been normalized to one standard deviation of the innovation
in all cases. Some di¤erences across models can be noticed when observing Figure 1. For instance,
the response of price ination, output and interest rate to a wage ination shock is larger in the
EHL model than in the CMV model. The opposite is true for the response of both price and wage
ination and the interest rate to an IS shock. After a technology shock, there is a stronger output
response and a weaker price ination reaction in the CMV model. More importantly, the CMV
model explains how unemployment reacts to alternative shocks. As expected, positive price, wage,
interest rate and productivity shocks increase unemployment whereas a positive IS shock reduces
it.
5 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the robustness of the empirical evidence reported in the previous section
along three dimensions. First, we consider three additional alternative measures for the cyclical
component of output. Second, we include U.S. data of payroll employment in addition to the ve
time series studied in the estimation of the CMV model. Finally, we estimate the model using data
from the pre-Volcker period and compare the estimation results with those found for the Great
Moderation.
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5.1 Output lters
As emphasized by Canova and Ferroni (2009), among other authors, the dynamic properties of
estimated macro models can vary depending on the lter used for output. We now show that our
parameter estimates are robust across ltering schemes. Table 5 displays the parameter estimates
of the CMV model under three alternative denitions of cyclical output. The rst denition is
obtained implementing a quadratic-trend decomposition. The second is given by Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) lter. Finally, the third considers directly the rate of growth of real GDP, which also captures
the high frequency uctuations of output. The estimation results are very similar for the four
denitions of output cyclical component studied. Moreover, the cyclical features of the CMV
model analyzed in Section 4 are also robust to the use of alternative cyclical components.10
5.2 Introducing employment and a labor supply shock
The benchmark estimation of the CMV model considers only unemployment time series as the
single variable describing labor market capacity. By contrast, the EHL model estimation includes
a measure of labor (total hours) instead of unemployment. In this subsection, we consider U.S.
data of payroll employment in addition to the ve time series studied in the benchmark case. The
inclusion of an additional time series forces us to introduce an additional shock.11 In particular,
we introduce an autocorrelated labor supply (disutility) shock, t, that would appear in equations
governing uctuations on both labor supply, (11), and potential output, (14). Table 6 shows the
estimation results using the set of six time series that includes both unemployment and payroll
employment. They are again quantitatively similar to those obtained for the benchmark model
reported in Table 1.
10Not shown due to space limitations. These results are available upon request to the authors.
11As discussed by Ireland (2004), there is a long-standing tradition of introducing additional disturbances into
DSGE models until the number of shocks equals the number of data series used in estimation. The reason is that
models of this type are quite stylized and introduce fewer shocks than observable variables, which implies that
models are stochastically singular. That is, the model implies that certain combinations of endogenous variables are
deterministic. If these combinations do not hold in the data, any approach that attempts to estimate the complete
model will fail.
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5.3 Pre-Volcker period (1957:Q1-1979:Q2)
This subsection analyzes the pre-Volcker period. Table 7 shows the estimation results in the CMV
and EHL models. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the Pre-Volcker sample starts in 1957
and nishes right before the arrival of Paul Volcker as Federal Reserve chairman, who introduced
changes in the operating procedures of the Fed. When comparing these estimation results with those
obtained for the Great Moderation data set, it is useful to distinguish four sets of parameters. The
rst is composed by the so called deep parameters (, , , ehl,  and ). The estimates are
robust across models and samples. The second set is formed by the indexation parameters (p and
w) and Calvo parameters (p and w). Indexation parameters are slightly larger during the Great
Moderation than in the pre-Volcker period. However, there are important di¤erences in the Calvo
parameter estimates. A comparison of the estimation results from the two samples shows that
the di¤erence between wage and price stickiness parameters in the two models becomes signicant
when the pre-Volcker period is considered, as wage stickiness was higher and price stickiness was
lower compared to the more recent period of the Great Moderation.
The third set of parameter estimates consists of the policy rule parameters (r,  and y).
The estimates from the pre-Volcker period are similar to those found for the Great Moderation
period, except for the ination coe¢ cient, which is signicantly lower for the two models in the
pre-Volcker period. This result is in line with previous evidence reported in the literature (Lubik
and Schorfheide, 2004; Canova, 2009). Moreover, the estimated ination coe¢ cient, lower than
one, associated with the CMV model implies that the Taylor principle did not hold during this
period. The fourth set comprises the autoregressive and standard deviation of shocks. On the one
hand, the autoregressive parameters ( and z) show a great deal of persistence in the pre-Volcker
shocks. On the other hand, the standard deviation of price, productivity and, to a lesser extent,
IS shocks are larger in the pre-Volcker than in the Great Moderation period. By contrast, the
standard deviation of wage and interest rate shocks are similar across samples.
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6 WELFARE COST OF BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS
Otrok (2001) and Lucas (2003) argue that the welfare cost of U.S. business cycles is small. They
calculate a welfare loss around 0.05% of consumption. Such low welfare cost is obtained in a model
with perfect competition and exible prices. Costain and Reiter (2005) calculate the welfare cost
of business cycles in a model with search frictions and exible prices, nding numbers signicantly
larger than Otrok and Lucas, in the range between 0.25% and 0.33% of consumption.
Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005) estimated the welfare cost of US post-war busi-
ness cycles using a model that incorporated two sources of nominal rigidities: sticky prices and
sticky wages. They found a welfare cost of 2.6% of steady-state consumption, which is much higher
than numbers from previous studies. As pointed out in their paper, nominal rigidities can bring
cross-sectional dispersion in relative prices and wages that produce large disparities in labor assign-
ments and, therefore, welfare losses. For example, the high wage dispersion observed with persistent
wage stickiness would result in a vast di¤erentiation of hours that would damage total utility.
As our particular contribution to the literature, we have calculated the welfare cost of US
business cycle in the estimated models. The welfare cost is measured at the corresponding business
cycles during the Great Moderation, using the Bayesian estimation results reported in Table 1.
Given the small macroeconomic volatility observed in that period, this exercise may bring a oor
value for the economic cost of cyclical uctuations. The welfare cost is obtained by quantifying the
utility loss caused by short-run uctuations. A three-step procedure is implemented. First, we take
a second-order approximation to the instantaneous utility function (1) in order to nd the inuence
of business cycle variabilities and price/wage dispersions. The second step consists of computing
the unconditional expectation of the second-order approximation. It renders in the CMV model:12
E

UCMV

= U ss   12var(c)  12 1 1var() + cov(c; )  12	var(n)
 12	
h
2p
(1 )2(1 p)2 var(4
p) +
22w
2
1
(1 )2(1 w)2
(1 p)
(1 wp)var(4
w)
i
;
where var(a) refers to the unconditional variance of variable a, cov(a; b) denotes the unconditional
12The proof is written in a technical appendix available under request. Steady-state employment has been normal-
ized to one, which implies unit steady-state consumption.
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covariance between variables a and b, and both 4p = p   pp 1 and 4w = w   ww 1
are changes in price ination and wage ination adjusted using the indexation weights.13 The last
line of E

UCMV

collects the welfare cuts caused by nominal rigidities because it would be ruled
out with both exible prices and exible wages, i.e. by setting p = w = 0. Finally, the third
step measures the welfare cost of cyclical uctuations as the percentage increase in consumption
required to compensate for the utility loss caused by the short-run variability.
For a comparison, the unconditional expectation of the utility function was also calculated in
the EHL model with this result
E

UEHL

= U ss   12var(c)  12 1 1var() + cov(c; )  12	var(n)
 12	

2p
(1 )2(1 p)2 var(4
p) +
2fw
(1 w)2 var(4
w)

:
The di¤erence between E [U ] and E

UEHL

is
E

UCMV
  E UEHL =  12	  22w21(1 )2(1 w)2 (1 p)(1 wp)   2fw(1 w)2

var(4w);
which captures the distinct treatment of the labor market and wage setting between the two models.
Table 8 reports the results of the welfare cost of cyclical uctuations measured by the consump-
tion equivalent. The baseline CMV model estimates a 0.60% of steady-state consumption. The
version of the sticky-wage model of EHL (2000) delivers a welfare loss estimate equal to 0.86%
of steady-state consumption. These numbers are clearly larger than Lucas and Otroks estimates,
probably because they did not allow labor dispersion in his perfect competition setup. In addition,
welfare losses of business cycle are larger than the number found by Costain and Reiter (2005),
which suggests that search frictions are not as inuential as nominal rigidities. However, the num-
bers obtained here are approximately one third of the values provided by Levin et al. (2005) in a
model also featuring sticky prices and sticky wages. Such di¤erence can be due to two reasons: i)
Levin et al. (2005)s number is obtained with post-war data that shows higher cyclical variability,
and ii) Levin et al. (2005)s model includes real money balance in the utility function which adds
welfare losses coming from monetary uctuations.
13 It should be noticed that the adjusted change of price ination gives a measure of "price dispersion" since it is
proportional to the log deviation between optimal prices and the aggregate price level, 4p = 1 p
p
log

P
P

. The
same kind of relationship applies to nominal wages, 4w = 1 w
w
log

W
W

.
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Table 8 shows that the CMV model gives a lower welfare cost than the EHL model (0.60% versus
0.86%). The lower welfare cost found in the CMV model can be explained by the bu¤ering e¤ect
of job-clearing wages. When labor demand is rising (falling), nominal wages increase (decrease) to
clear the positive (negative) gap between labor demand and supply. The EHL model introduces a
wage setting behavior driven by the mrs gap, which is has no direct implication on reducing labor
dispersion.
The last term on the expressions for E

UCMV

and E

UEHL

shown above brings the contri-
bution of nominal rigidities to the welfare cost of business cycles. Actually, Table 8 reports that
nominal rigidities cause most welfare cost of business cycle. If exible prices or wages are imposed
in the model the welfare loss due to cyclical uctuations falls signicantly. Thus, having exible
prices in the estimated CMV model cuts welfare cost in approximately half (from 0.6% to 0.28%).
A similar reduction is observed when having exible wages (from 0.60 to 0.31).14 Therefore, price
stickiness and wage stickiness have similar weights on the guilt of welfare losses due to cyclical
uctuations.
In the EHL model, however, the relative inuence of price or wage stickiness brings very di¤erent
conclusions in the welfare analysis. Thus, the EHL model with exible prices reduces the welfare
loss to approximately one fourth (from 0.86% to 0.22%). Thus, price rigidities explain most welfare
cost of business cycle. Meanwhile, setting the EHL model with exible wages would bring an
increase in welfare loss! Having exible wages would increase the welfare cost from 0.86% to
0.98% of steady-state consumption. This unexpected results is found because the increase in wage
ination volatility with fully-exible wages is exported to price ination through higher marginal
cost dispersion.
Finally, if both sources of nominal rigidities (sticky prices and sticky wages) were eliminated
from the model, the welfare loss would be further reduced to 0.23% in the CMV model and 0.08%
in the EHL model. These numbers are much closer to Lucasestimate than the ones obtained in the
baseline version of the models. Moreover, these numbers are slightly smaller than Lucasestimates
14Jung and Kuester (2009) nd a welfare cost of business cycles close to 0.20% of steady-state consumption in a
model that combine sticky prices, search frictions and exible wages.
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when shutting down consumption preference shocks.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Only in recent times, the New-Keynesian model has incorporated endogenous uctuations of un-
employment due to search frictions (Trigari, 2009; Walsh, 2005) or, alternatively, to sticky wages
(Casares, 2007, 2008). We have estimated a modied version of the latter variant (the CMV model)
using U.S. data from the "Great Moderation" period (1984-2008). Our estimation results suggest
that price and wage rigidities are both signicantly high and of similar size. Compared to the pre-
Volcker period (1957:1-1979:2), price stickiness has increased while wage rigidities have diminished
a bit. In addition, we found that the inertial components of price and wage ination dynamics are
not very large, which implies that both variables are mainly driven by forward-looking dynamics.
Demand (IS) shocks are the main driving force over the business cycle, as they explain most of
the observed variability in output, labor, and the nominal interest rate. Results are similar in an
estimated version of the sticky-wage model of Erceg et al. (2000), referred here as the EHL model.
Unlike the EHL model, the CMV model provides a measure of unemployment uctuations
based on staggered wage contracts: the fraction of non-renegotiated wage contracts delivers un-
employment as a mismatch between labor supply and labor demand in the extensive margin. The
estimated CMV model provides a good matching of the second-moment statistics of unemployment
obtained in the data (standard deviation, correlation with output and autocorrelation). Impulse-
response functions show that unemployment is procyclical with demand shocks and countercyclical
with supply shocks. In the variance decomposition, demand-side shocks, such as consumption
preference innovations and monetary policy shocks, explain most unemployment variability. We
also estimated the model under alternative detrending techniques and without employment as an
observable variable. In all cases, the results are robust. For the pre-Volcker period (1957:1-1979:2),
wage stickiness was higher and that the interest rate response to ination was signicantly lower
than after 1984.
Finally, the welfare cost of nominal rigidities during the Great Moderation has been estimated
to be 0.60% of steady-state consumption in the CMV model and 0.86% in the EHL model. These
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numbers are clearly higher than the estimate obtained by Lucas (2003), but lower than the number
reported by Levin et al. (2005) using a sticky-price, sticky-wage estimated model with post-war
U.S. data.
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Table 1. Priors and estimated posteriors of structural parameters
Priors Posteriors
CMV EHL
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
 Normal 2:00 0:10 2:11 1:95 2:25 2:11 1:95 2:27
 Normal 4:00 0:50 4:66 3:99 5:35 4:34 3:78 4:91
 Normal 6:00 0:50 6:18 5:45 6:83 6:30 5:81 6:85
f Normal 4:00 0:50 4:18 3:62 5:02
 Normal 0:36 0:01 0:36 0:34 0:37 0:36 0:35 0:37
 Normal 0:99 0:01 0:99 0:97 1:00 0:99 0:97 1:00
p Normal 0:50 0:10 0:47 0:36 0:55 0:59 0:48 0:69
w Normal 0:50 0:10 0:38 0:29 0:48 0:33 0:24 0:44
p Beta 0:50 0:10 0:82 0:78 0:86 0:88 0:84 0:91
w Beta 0:50 0:10 0:85 0:81 0:88 0:82 0:77 0:87
r Beta 0:75 0:10 0:84 0:80 0:87 0:83 0:79 0:86
 Normal 1:70 0:30 2:00 1:74 2:36 2:02 1:67 2:29
y Gamma 0:125 0:10 0:70 0:51 0:95 0:35 0:23 0:50
 Beta 0:50 0:15 0:94 0:91 0:96 0:90 0:87 0:93
z Beta 0:50 0:15 0:87 0:83 0:92 0:91 0:87 0:93
p Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 0:43 0:35 0:53 0:60 0:43 0:76
w Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 1:12 0:90 1:33 0:95 0:79 1:12
r Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 0:16 0:15 0:18 0:15 0:13 0:16
z Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 0:44 0:38 0:49 0:45 0:39 0:49
 Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 2:46 1:76 3:08 1:76 1:44 1:98
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Table 2. Business cycle statistics - Linear Trend
by p w R u
U.S. data, 1984:1-2008:2
Standard deviation 1:60 0:25 0:60 0:54 1:06
Correlation with output 1:0 0:03 0:25 0:23  0:59
Autocorrelation 0:95 0:48 0:15 0:97 0:98
Estimated CMV model
Standard deviation 1:30 0:26 0:66 0:41 0:98
Correlation with output 1:0 0:11 0:18 0:15  0:48
Autocorrelation 0:89 0:51 0:31 0:91 0:72
Estimated EHL model
Standard deviation 1:30 0:28 0:63 0:35  
Correlation with output 1:0  0:19 0:04  0:21  
Autocorrelation 0:88 0:56 0:29 0:89  
Table 3. Forecast error variance decomposition of CMV model
Shock
p w "R z 
Output 0:0201 0:0034 0:0612 0:3164 0:5988
Potential output 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:6078 0:3922
Labor supply 0:0104 0:0818 0:0104 0:0722 0:8252
Labor demand 0:0281 0:0049 0:0866 0:0847 0:7957
Unemployment 0:0610 0:2017 0:3626 0:0637 0:3109
Real wage 0:2054 0:6277 0:0502 0:0287 0:0879
Price ination 0:7624 0:0479 0:0102 0:0313 0:1482
Wage ination 0:0125 0:9002 0:0277 0:0045 0:0551
Nom. interest rate 0:0722 0:0129 0:2221 0:1266 0:5662
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Table 4. Forecast error variance decomposition of EHL model
Shock
p w "R z 
Output 0:0603 0:0392 0:0891 0:2815 0:5298
Potential output 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:7838 0:2162
Total hours 0:0753 0:0477 0:1109 0:1089 0:6572
MRS 0:1844 0:1162 0:2729 0:0475 0:3790
Real wage 0:2582 0:7056 0:0044 0:0230 0:0088
Price ination 0:8256 0:1201 0:0029 0:0248 0:0266
Wage ination 0:0055 0:9808 0:0028 0:0017 0:0092
Nom. interest rate 0:2143 0:0781 0:3131 0:1231 0:2714
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Table 5. Estimates under alternative cyclical components of output.
Quadratic HP Growth rate
Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
 2:11 1:98 2:24 2:09 1:94 2:27 2:08 1:97 2:29
 4:52 3:81 4:99 4:76 4:09 5:40 4:72 4:13 5:34
 6:20 5:39 6:92 6:09 5:39 6:86 6:05 5:35 6:79
 0:36 0:34 0:37 0:36 0:34 0:37 0:36 0:34 0:37
 0:99 0:97 1:00 0:99 0:97 1:00 0:99 0:97 1:00
p 0:45 0:33 0:54 0:44 0:35 0:51 0:47 0:37 0:60
w 0:36 0:26 0:43 0:41 0:29 0:53 0:36 0:24 0:50
p 0:82 0:79 0:87 0:82 0:78 0:85 0:82 0:78 0:86
w 0:85 0:82 0:88 0:84 0:81 0:87 0:86 0:83 0:89
r 0:85 0:82 0:88 0:84 0:81 0:88 0:86 0:83 0:88
 1:97 1:55 2:48 1:86 1:58 2:21 1:98 1:66 2:32
y 0:73 0:47 0:94 0:70 0:46 0:89 0:73 0:46 0:99
 0:94 0:91 0:96 0:93 0:90 0:96 0:94 0:92 0:96
z 0:85 0:78 0:91 0:81 0:77 0:86 0:89 0:83 0:93
p 0:41 0:34 0:50 0:39 0:33 0:45 0:44 0:33 0:57
w 1:07 0:90 1:30 1:21 0:90 1:53 1:07 0:82 1:33
r 0:16 0:14 0:18 0:17 0:15 0:21 0:16 0:13 0:18
z 0:45 0:36 0:51 0:41 0:36 0:47 0:49 0:40 0:57
 2:38 1:69 2:84 2:14 1:65 2:54 2:37 1:74 2:81
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Table 6. Estimation results using Employment time series.
Priors Posteriors
CMV
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95%
 Normal 2:00 0:10 2:11 1:97 2:21
 Normal 4:00 0:50 5:64 5:23 6:36
 Normal 6:00 0:50 6:30 5:58 7:37
 Normal 0:36 0:01 0:35 0:34 0:37
 Normal 0:99 0:01 0:99 0:97 1:01
p Normal 0:50 0:10 0:57 0:44 0:73
w Normal 0:50 0:10 0:39 0:31 0:48
p Beta 0:50 0:10 0:78 0:73 0:82
w Beta 0:50 0:10 0:83 0:81 0:87
r Beta 0:75 0:10 0:80 0:77 0:83
 Normal 1:70 0:30 1:78 1:60 2:13
y Gamma 0:125 0:10 0:57 0:36 0:72
 Beta 0:50 0:15 0:89 0:86 0:91
z Beta 0:50 0:15 0:94 0:91 0:96
 Beta 0:50 0:15 0:96 0:95 0:98
p Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 0:60 0:38 0:89
y Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 1:12 0:92 1:23
r Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 0:17 0:15 0:19
z Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 0:44 0:39 0:48
 Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 1:58 1:31 1:87
 Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 1:85 1:61 2:05
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Table 7. Estimation results for the pre-Volcker period.
Priors Posteriors
CMV EHL
Distr. Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
 Normal 2:00 0:10 2:00 1:83 2:14 1:99 1:87 2:16
 Normal 4:00 0:50 4:04 3:24 4:68 4:14 3:39 5:13
 Normal 6:00 0:50 6:31 5:05 7:16 5:95 5:43 6:63
f Normal 4:00 0:50 3:87 2:99 4:46
 Normal 0:36 0:01 0:35 0:34 0:37 0:35 0:34 0:36
 Normal 0:99 0:01 0:98 0:97 1:00 0:99 0:98 0:99
p Normal 0:50 0:10 0:61 0:49 0:76 0:55 0:44 0:67
w Normal 0:50 0:10 0:52 0:46 0:61 0:57 0:48 0:68
p Beta 0:50 0:10 0:71 0:63 0:79 0:58 0:52 0:62
w Beta 0:50 0:10 0:92 0:89 0:95 0:85 0:84 0:85
r Beta 0:75 0:10 0:76 0:70 0:82 0:84 0:80 0:87
 Normal 1:70 0:30 0:89 0:66 1:11 1:03 0:82 1:28
y Gamma 0:5=4 0:10 0:67 0:52 0:79 0:63 0:40 0:98
 Beta 0:50 0:15 0:93 0:91 0:96 0:90 0:87 0:93
z Beta 0:50 0:15 0:94 0:91 0:98 0:92 0:87 0:96
p Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 1:19 0:87 1:64 0:98 0:75 1:33
w Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 1:11 0:89 1:32 1:27 0:98 1:58
r Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 0:15 0:13 0:18 0:14 0:12 0:17
z Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 1:01 0:83 1:18 0:75 0:69 0:83
 Inv Gamma 0:15 0:15 2:98 2:26 3:85 2:95 2:55 3:42
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Table 8. Welfare cost of business cycle uctuations (% of steady-state consumption).
CMV model EHL model
Baseline estimation 0.60 0.86
Imposing exible prices and wages (p = w = 0) 0.23 0.08
Imposing exible wages (w = 0) 0.31 0.98
Imposing exible prices (p = 0) 0.28 0.22
Imposing exible prices and wages and no IS shocks (p = w = var() = 0) 0.04 0.02
34
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 5
0
0 . 5
p r i c e  in f l a t i o n
e
p
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 0 5
0
0 . 0 5
w a g e  i n f la t i o n
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 2
0
0 . 2
o u t p u t
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 1
0
0 . 1
in t e r e s t  r a t e
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 2
0
0 . 2
u n e m p lo y m e n t
0 1 0 2 0
0
0 . 0 5
e
w
0 1 0 2 0
- 1
0
1
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 1
- 0 . 0 5
0
0 1 0 2 0
0
0 . 0 2
0 . 0 4
0 1 0 2 0
0
0 . 1
0 . 2
0 1 0 2 0
0
0 . 0 2
0 . 0 4
e
c
0 1 0 2 0
0
0 . 0 5
0 . 1
0 1 0 2 0
0
0 . 5
0 1 0 2 0
0
0 . 0 5
0 . 1
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 4
- 0 . 2
0
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 0 2
- 0 . 0 1
0
e
r
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 1
0
0 . 1
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 5
0
0 . 5
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 2
0
0 . 2
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 5
0
0 . 5
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 0 4
- 0 . 0 2
0
e
z
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 0 5
0
0 . 0 5
0 1 0 2 0
0
0 . 2
0 . 4
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 0 4
- 0 . 0 2
0
0 1 0 2 0
- 0 . 5
0
0 . 5
Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions from estimated CMV (thick) and EHL (thin) models.
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